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1 POWER AND MEMORY 
 
In this conversation, I wish to trace with you some connections between memory and 
power.  
 
Milan Kundera said, memorably, that the struggle of men [and I add women] for justice and 
rights is always and everywhere the struggle between memory and forgetfulness.    
To this I add a footnote. Contrary to public adage, public memory is not short but rather 
made short by acts of dominance. Any respectable notion of struggle then names 
insurrection of suppressed memory. 
One has only to think of Mohandas Gandhi, though unfortunately no feminist figuration, an 
issue that we all must revisit in terms of life and times of anti colonial / imperial struggles, in 
this context. Despite many notable endeavours, he is, and must be, all but forgotten.  
 
His memory is so subversive indeed that the Indian nation is permitted to recall him only 
twice a year: January 31, the national Martyr’s day and October 2, his birthday.  
The passage that marks the transition form Mohandas to Mahatma is too subversive for us all 
to recall. It is subversive because this transition marks a whole variety of questioning of the 
modes of production of rightlessness in Indian society, politics, and even our ways of 
performing activism for social transformation 
 
Of course, and equally important, are the tasks of reorganizing political memory. January 9 
now marks a new BJP/ NDA national coalition governance way of official memorialising 
the Mahatma. This was the day of his return form South Africa.  
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Now, this historic passage is put to obscene globalizing usage in a contemporary Indian 
politics. The memory of this archetypal figure that brought India to freedom is now 
shrivelled to a prototype of an inaugural NRI!  That prefiguration is now to be deployed to 
harness the whirlwind of globalization! 
Kasturba and Mohandas Gandhi had no thought of what they may gain from return to India; 
they did not ask for tax havens and dual citizenship /nationality; they did not bring to the 
Indian struggle an expanding Forex reserve or global capitalist technology! 
All they brought with them were the intimations of mortality of the British Empire and the 
messages of the Swaraj, in all its protean plenitude. They also summoned national liberation 
from the future history of Hindutva politics of extremism, which many a contemporary 
NRI paracommunity now so perversely promotes and supports.  
 
11 REMEMBERING J. P. NAIK  
 
     
The arts of memory pose many a difficult, even poignant, moment of critical negotiation.  
Even when we, and in the first instance, negotiate memory through biographical prism, all 
we have are fragments. To remember is to reconstruct these fragments into a narrative 
wholeness. The difficulties are daunting indeed when we recall that each act/ performance of 
biographical remembrance, as readers at least of Toni Morrison (and in a different vein of 
Patricia Williams) know, also entails a measure of creative and fiduciary social agency.     
My association with J. P. Naik was episodical but it bequeathed me many ethical 
endowments. I learnt from him at least six difficult virtues: the need to innovate institutions, 
practice vigilance over details, exact austerity in institutional expenditure, develop ability to 
relate to interdisciplinary traditions of communication, find the twenty-fifth hour every day 
and achieve directness in conversation that at the same time did not offend other people. 
This last virtue got eroded in the course of my social and human rights activism. And I could 
not quite imbibe the virtue of institution- building, unlike Vina Mazumdar and Lotika 
Sarkar, with their illustrious sisters, have indeed carried forward this luminous legacy. I read, 
for example, JP’s message of institution building very differently, especially as subjecting 
every institution I had the privilege of serving to a severe public/ social audit; fortunately 
they were fairly robust institutions and survived my attempts at ‘leadership!’    
I first met with J.P in the early seventies where I sought to persuade him to accord legal 
studies the status of social science within the ICSSR framework. Initially, ‘law’ was not 
conceptualised as a ‘social science’ in the Council’s agendum presumably because there was 
no collective demand for such recognition. True to form, J.P. heard me without interruption 
and with rather disconcerting patience.  Towards the end of the meeting said that he felt like 
agreeing with me but his agreement was not enough, he had to carry others. Thus he seduced 
me with a request that I prepare an ICSSR working paper. I had not quite bargained for this 
sentence of nine-month hard labour that finally resulted in the monograph Socio-Legal 
Research in India: A Programschrift. During that year, he found time to call me every so often, 
with a degree of discomfiting relish, concerning the progress of the work.    
Within weeks, not merely he promptly published the manuscript in the ICSSR Monograph 
Series (itself an innovation), set up follow up committee, but also organized a seminar at 
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Pune to discuss further the programschrift. From this also arose the beginnings of my book, 
The Crisis of the Indian Legal System that J.P. later fostered under the ICCSSR- Vikas 
publications programme.  
J.P. meant business; he was not the one to wait endlessly for perfectionist academic 
schedules; he wanted results on set time format and was in haste to share these widely to 
acquire momentum for new ideas. These are qualities that unfortunately progressively 
dissipated in the subsequent institutional career of the ICSSR. Somehow, the learned 
professionals that led the Council after him did not possess the same élan vital. And here I 
speak of some very distinguished social scientist friends. 
 
J.P.s nudging paved the way for several emergences. First, legal studies (because law in itself 
cannot aspire to be a ‘science’ in any sense of that word!) acquired threshold ICSSR eligibility 
for funding. Second, the Pune Seminar alerted us all to the need that law teachers and 
researchers should at least be consumers of related social science research in order that they 
eventually become producers. This led to a programme of workshops in Delhi for two years 
in the deadly heat of May! J.P. won’t hear of holding these events in more comforting climes! 
Third, many happy consequences emerged as a result of these workshops. Law teachers 
began to take interest in ‘socio-legal,’ empirical research and became sensitive to curricular 
innovation in ways that made possible foundational master’s courses in legal and social 
science methods, supported by the University Grants Commission. Since the Eighties, major 
empirical research in law has ensued, some of world-class quality and this owes a great deal to 
J.P.Naik. The emergence of the discipline of sociology of Indian law owes a great deal to the 
fantastic drive and energy that J. P. provided in nascent stages. 
 
I have no hesitation in saying that the ‘puritan’ J.P. made my life rather difficult! The two 
ICSSR social and legal science workshops I held at Delhi University required that I provide 
him with a rigorously detailed budget over which he wielded a large red pencil! He insisted 
that tea be served only twice during the day, and that two biscuits on each occasion were just 
right enough! He laid down the overall size of the stencilled materials (there was no Xerox 
these days!) that may be distributed. He himself monitored to a point of excess every 
budgetary line, including those that concerned travel by rail (J.P. simply won’t hear about air 
fares!) All of us volubly grumbled but to no effect! No wonder, he ended up with a surplus 
even over the meagre budget he initial provided!  Incidentally, these were the best workshops 
in terms of net output in my entire Indian academic experience!  
There is a curious story to be told yet. The then Director of the Indian Law Institute, 
Shrimander Nath Jain, called me in panic asking me to subscribe to the Indian Law Institute 
Cooperative Housing Society; they did not make a minimum of twelve members which 
meant the loss of the site allocated by the Delhi Development Authority. However, 
membership involved depositing a sum of Rs. 10,000, which I did not then have! I turned to 
J.P. with a request for an advance royalty on the publication of the Crisis book. True to 
form, he disconcerted me by asking whatever made me think that my book will fetch a 
shadow of that sum! Obviously, I missed the twinkle in his eye and thought I had returned 
empty-handed. Not so. The cheque arrived the next week. The thriving complex at 
Karkardhuma, now named Law Apartments, should indeed have been named as J.P.Naik 
apartments because without that cheque the Institute Housing Society would never have 
been formed!       
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My last visitation with J.P. was at his home in Pune. He was so ill that he had difficulties 
conversing. As always, he reached for my hand and with a gentle pressure said words to the 
effect: ‘Do not relax the pace of your work.’  That message of relentless work culture defined 
this man.  
 
How relevant today is the message of JP? Are penurious modes of knowledge production 
any longer the most morally sensible in a sub-continent of harrowing impoverishment and 
injustice?   
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111 THE TWO JPs: TOWARDS EQUALITY AND TOTAL REVOLUTION  
 
The art of memory invites meditation on the initials ‘J.P’, that immediately bring to the 
mind the other J.P., Jay Prakash Narain, the person who fomented and led the Total 
Revolution.  May we recall the one without the other? At the same time how dare we recall 
them together?  
 
Did they have anything in common beyond the first initials? And are common initials any 
valid indicators of comparability? Is any attempt to compare them simply outrageous? Does 
it entail an extraordinary disorder of memory that is a departure from somehow sanctioned 
politically correct ways of remembering? 
 
My way of remembering the two J.P.s celebrates the disorder of memory, in ways that 
remind us that protocols of memory carry with them episodes of censorship. But that 
disorder is then a new kind of ordering, juxtaposition in which milieux are made to relate to 
tasks of memory.          
Both J.P.s were indeed true Mohandasians (incidentally, as some of you know, I do not use 
the last name ‘Gandhi’ as evokes different histories of appropriation; nor can I use his second 
name that was appropriated by a Doordarshan popular espionage serial!)  Both practiced 
simple Mohandasian virtues: austerity, integrity, and commitment.   
Both J.P.s were in a sense ‘Naiks.’ In one sense, the historic caste order sense, ‘Naik’ is a 
hereditary conveyor of caste domination. In an achieved, rather than ascribed, sense the term 
‘Naik’ signifies also a theory of leadership, fostering impulses for social transformation.  
For both our ‘Naiks,’ leadership was ethical or not at all. Both regarded leadership as 
transformative praxis. Both believed fervently in integrity in public life. For Jay Prakash 
Narain the bases of transformation lay in mass movement and civil disobedience; J.P. Naik 
celebrated faith that defined renovation of humane education and social science research as 
engines of reform. 
Where J. P. Naik sought social transformation from within institutions of governance and 
knowledges, Jay Prakash Narain sought total transformation of the character and content of 
governance through cascading public protest. Narain mobilized the masses; Naik, through 
his impassioned concerned with education and research, sought to mobilize the epistemic 
classes. Narain urged disobedience to unjust laws and governance; Naik sought to reform 
these from within. Naik sought to reimagine India through the transformation of practices of 
teaching and research; for Narain what mattered were ways of direct performances of 
continuing education of the masses in ways that nurtured the dialectic of popular 
sovereignty.  Naik placed his faith in incremental transformation of habits and cultures of 
governance; Narain sought a radical break. When Narain sought to destabilize institutions, 
Naik sought to build institutions.   
Today both these models of India of the Seventies lie in the ‘ruins of memory.’ The 
successive New Education Policies emphasizing ‘value education’ have brought us to a sorry 
pass when even the Supreme Court of India is unable to distinguish secular from Hindutva 
‘value’ education! Corruption, state lawlessness and malgovernance have increased in range 
Upendra Baxi, Memory and Rightlessness, J.P.Naik Memorial Lecture, CWDS 
December 13, 2002; final text May 25, 2003 
 
6 
and intensity. Contemporary economic globalization of India, which I believe each Naik 
would have opposed differently, now threatens to render both supremely irrelevant. 
Nothing will delight me more than a lusty dissentient murmur suggesting that I may be 
wholly mistaken in saying this.   
Neither J.P. claimed to be a feminist thinker. Narain’ s life and work is of little interest for 
the Indian feminists. Certainly, he left no document as pervasive as Towards Equality. The 
work, under the collective leadership of Vina Mazumdar (see Mazumdar; N. d; Id., 1997), 
towards that report brought a unique community of persons and concerns that lasted far 
beyond the tabling of the Report in Parliament on 18 February 1975. Progressive work 
towards further epistemic and solidarity tasks that commenced during the period of Indira 
Gandhi ordained Emergency period clustered, even sheltered, individuals opposed to it. J. P. 
Naik’s deft move to ‘acquire’ a more lasting association of Vina Mazumdar with the ICSSR 
proved fateful both for the fulfilment of an agendum of implementation of the Report and 
created future space and role for feminization of Indian social theory, governance, and 
political action.  
Vina Mazumdar provided indefatigable auspices. With an amazing J.P Naik type capability, 
she was able to mobilize the best and the brightest theorists and activists. The foundational 
phase of the ICCSR committee attracted in the first phase many eminences such as B. N. 
Ganguli, Asok Mitra, Krishna Bharadwaj, Leela Dube, M. N. Srinivas and Justice Krishna 
Iyer. She then moved to from and found the Centre for Women’s Development Studies that 
continues to provide even now a most resilient national framework for scientific and solidary 
tasks.  
How may we trace the relation between Total Revolution and the rise of ‘women’s studies?’ 
One may understandably want to say that the agendum of Total Revolution stood here fully 
feminised or at least directed to women’s plights and rights but this remains problematic in 
terms of archival history. The complex and reflexive history of multiple interconnections 
between the inauguration of a movement towards equality for all women, the radical logics 
of Total Revolution, and the political contexts of the Emergency and its aftermath has yet to 
be written. A full archive will narrate co-equally the role of contingency and necessity and I 
here raise only a few, hopefully useful, issues in this direction.   
Towards Equality is indeed monumental, precisely in the Foucaldian sense. Foucault said 
memorably that if in the older times monuments were the only documents of history, in 
contemporary times documents tend to become monuments. The distinction is important in 
several ways. Documents bear birthmarks of authorship; monuments embody massive 
unacknowledged anonymous labour. Documents foster epistemic and activist careers 
honouring their producers; the real producers of monuments leave no historic traces. If 
monuments remain frozen history, documents acquire an autonomous future life of their 
own. Most monuments are triumphalist statements celebrating the power, glory, and grief of 
human history; the losers leave few ‘monuments’ behind. Documents in contrast are open to 
readings that testify to histories of power, domination, as well as of resistance. Even so, the 
authentic subaltern thus emerges as a being rendered incapable of creating an archive of 
either kind. Both ‘documents’ and ‘monuments’ consecrate orders of memory that remain 
indifferent, even inhospitable and hostile, to this lack.  
But not all documents become monumental. When we look at contemporary history of the 
Seventies that provides a register of a variety of upheavals and upsurges, this lack manifests 
overwhelmingly. Neither the Naxalite struggles, highlighting the role of militant women 
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cadres and their conception of people’s democratic rights, nor the struggles of the real 
women participating in the total revolution movement left such visible and recursive 
endowment comparable to Towards Equality. They left no such national monument; they 
exist, if at all, merely as entries in the police ‘encounter’ killings or the Emergency prison 
records.  
How then may we situate Towards Equality and its versatile programmatic aftermaths? It 
seems, at the moments of originary conception and of subsequent unfoldment, to have little 
space for memory of genres of the Naxalite and the Total Revolution conceptions and praxes 
of women’s emancipation. Is it possible to say that the thematic of women’s equality 
addresses these narratives of struggle rather through indistinction than focally? Is J.P. Naik a 
more crucial memory endowment, on this register, than Jay Prakash Narain?  Or is there an 
organic connection between Total Revolution and Towards Equality, providing a mode of 
reconciling the two ‘Naiks?’ If so, how may a silver jubilee reissue of this Report bridge, as it 
were, the ‘two solitudes’ (a phrase of reconciliation for Charles Taylor in the Canadian 
context)? How may this reissue archive a different register of memory seeking to rescue the 
Total Revolution and Naxalite women from oblivion? They composed a parallel report 
through their praxis, posing a crucial question: How do we construct narratives of sacrificial 
lives of women in the telling of subversive stories? Perhaps, one way to construct framing 
narratives is to have side by side with J.P.Naik Memorial Lecture and Prabha Narain 
Memorial Lecture, and Sudesh Vaid Memorial Lecture, as well.   
 
IV IMAGES OF MEMORY 
 
In a manner of speaking, I have already begun conversation about memory and 
rightlessness. I must now address it with less indirection. 
 
There are several images of memory, which I can barely indicate at the outset but may not 
pursue for want of time and a certain lack of competence.  
 
First, our images of relationship between memory and history stand often in relation of 
mutual opposition. As the French thinker Pierre Nora reminds us: if memory ‘is always a 
phenomenon of the present, a bond tying us to the eternal presence’, history is a 
‘representation of the past.’ As reconstruction of the ‘ always complete problematic and 
incomplete, of what is no longer’ history calls for ‘analysis and critical discourse’ (1996:3); 
the ‘art of memory’ is different from the craft of Clio because it is used to service, to 
reconfigure the living present.     
 
Second, the ‘images of memory [as Maurice Halbwachs (1941) reminds us] expose the ways 
in which ‘a group colonizes the past by locating images of its values in the landscape of the 
past’ (Hutton, 1997: 56, 58.) Halbwachs suggests acutely that memory ‘is socially mediated 
as a present judgement about what to trust, emphasize, repress, or deny from our 
remembered past’; this mediation serving functions of forms of organized knowledges – ‘of 
giving priority to some things, while consigning others to oblivion’ (Hutton, 1997; 378, 
381.) We need to note here the relationship between not just memory and power but 
memory and trust.  
 
Third, among these mediations, as Simon Schama preciously reminds us in his Landscape & 
Memory (1995), is the way in which construction of memory may be said to speak to 
future:  ‘Instead of being yet another explanation of what we have lost, it is an exploration 
of what we may find’ (p.14.) Exploration for Schama is that genre of construction of social 
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memory that reminds us that ‘ help for our ills can come from within, rather than outside, 
our shared mental world…’ (p. 19), something that orders of explanation may not quite 
achieve.     
 
Fourth, however administration and management of memory in state and civil society 
erase residues of justice in social life; for example, the typical device of commissions of 
enquiry from the first commission that in 1968 investigates the violence against minorities 
in Gujarat to their residuary legates now dealing with the carnage in Gujarat 2002.   These 
arrangements of power rewrite contemporary history, presenting it in terms (of what 
Hannah Arendt described to Karl Jaspers as) the ‘banality’ of evil, in which ‘organized 
attempts’ flourish ‘to eradicate the concept of human being’ (1992,69), in which 
governance as business as usual secures willing compliance and cooperation of otherwise 
themselves ‘decent’ beings into the ultimate complicity with the political that eliminates 
the very bearer of human rights, and thereby also the possibility of human rightlessness.      
 
Fifth, an issue as yet I believe not fully explored in literature concerning memory, is the 
image of course the one of intense contemporary pertinence; the issue of construction of 
memories in this era of global capitalism. This indeed raises all sorts of issues concerning 
the ‘banality of geographical evils’ (Harvey, 2000.) This very description alerts us to the to 
tasks of deciphering the cruel complexities of the timespace (history and geography) of 
routnization of evils (their dispersal into a kind of collective political unconscious) under 
the auspices of global capitalism. The production of human rightlessness stands facilitated 
by modes of construction of spatiality via marketization, commodification, and exchange 
of circuits that disrupt and disorganize the time of public memory.  Is it the case that under 
the zodiac of contemporary globalization memory is just what the global ‘market’ may 
find sustainable, whether these be markets of human rights (Baxi, 2002) or of the Global 
Coalition on War against Mass International Terrorism, or those of so-called ‘good 
governance’ as sponsored by the international financial institutions and their normative 
national cohorts in India? Only a handful of people thus mourn the Bhopal catastrophe 
and the continuing victimage, though we all celebrate the Human Rights Day only five 
days later each December! The global ‘assassins of memory’ remain omnipresent, haunting 
popular mobilization of memory as a resource for doing activism. 
    
This afternoon I focus merely on some aspects of politics of memory and its fecund role in 
the production of forms of Indian rightlessness.    
V   MEMORY OF THOSE WHO ARE NOT THERE 
How may we, the activist memory workers, begin to fashion a response to these many 
modes of politically organized oblivion, even genesis amnesia?  And to what ends?   
In order that we may relate memory to production of rightlessness, we need to attend to the 
problematique of memory and justice. 
Jacques Derrida enunciates this problem in terms of memory and justice thus: 
 
 No justice…seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some 
 responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, 
before the ghosts of those who are not yet born  
 or who are already dead, … without …responsibility and…respect for  
 justice concerning those who are not there…(1994: xix.)  
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Derrida guides us to the linkage between memory and justice. Without memory of violation 
and victimage (arising from ‘nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist or other kinds of 
exterminations, victims of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism’) 
justice is neither possible nor thinkable.  Their spectral presence is a necessary condition for 
thinking and doing justice in society.  
The art of memory links responsibility and justice.  In so far owed, in the first instance, to 
the intentionally annihilated peoples, ‘ those who are not there, ’ the ethic of memory seems 
especially difficult to construct because it entails both vengeance and forgiveness that will 
always mark the impossibility of justice. When the vengeance takes the form of ex post facto 
punishment and forgiveness entails nationalization of memory and suffering through the 
device of truth and reconciliation commissions, we stand confronted by the problem of 
victor’s justice; and the reduction of the testimony of the violated as the raw material for 
national ‘reconstruction’ via compromistic structures of accountability in whose shaping 
they have no voice and over whose powers they have no control. In both situations, 
construction of memory   seems to relate more to power than to justice .In each the violated 
retain their spectral quality.  
To be sure, Derrida here has in view the construction of memory as a work of mourning, 
not as an affair of the law; the ‘question of justice,’ he says, is ‘one that always carries beyond 
the law…’(p.26.) Memory, then, is the matam, the power of lamentation for those not there, 
a form of ability to grieve collectively the past histories of injustice and violation and 
anticipations of their future recurrence. The work of mourning, this power of creating 
memory, speaks to grief and bereavement of the past and of their infinite future recurrence. 
The tasks of justice then are inconceivable outside the frame and the power of civic 
lamentation. It is on this site that those living now, those already dead, and the future 
generations of those without being there begin to coalesce as communities of mourning. The 
prowess that they may thus marshal to haunt those living possessed of the power to impose 
hurt and harm, mayhem and murder on others remains, however, enwombed in historic 
contingency.    
But how do we mourn for the living dead, those who are not there? These not there women, 
men, and children live in the present; they are the people who exist but are denied visibility 
and voice; their actual physical existence / survival (bare life in terms of Agamben) is a code 
for their living death; they exist physically as if they were as yet not born or had died many a 
time after their birth. These are the truly rightless peoples, peoples who exist only by virtue 
of their being expendable and disposable, and whose being there is indeed a case of not being 
there. These diasporic communities of death interpose between the past and the future.  
These are people whom Derrida describes acutely as those who were ‘already there without 
being there’ (p.79, emphasis in original.)  
The question is: how activist memory workers may affirm the existence of such peoples and 
persons who were already there without being there, those whose presence affirms a kind of 
absence, who thus remain eminently disposable? How may ‘we’ create histories of memory 
that nurse and nurture the insurgent will to truth and justice? Is there a possibility that our 
ways of doing activism may end up, no matter what the original intention, in the production 
of human rightlessness and injustice? Specifically, I need to draw your attention to the rapid 
transformation of human rights movements into human rights markets, a theme that I have 
recently explored in my The Future of Human Rights (2002)?   
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Markets for human rights arise when we construct memories of the violated as symbolic 
goods and commodities that acquire significant exchange value via commodification of 
human suffering. People and persons who were already there without being there acquire a 
flicker of existence in niche activist markets, as designer goods that circulate as causus celebre, 
as well funded thematics for projects, institutions, and seminars, perfecting our own 
distinctive transformative credentials.        
I have in view here the case of Kamala, a young tribal girl, who was bought and sold (for 
2500 rupees, half the price of a buffalo, as Justice Jamadar of Bombay High Court was later 
to describe the terms of trade) three times within a week from the state circuit (guest) house, 
the third time round by two intrepid journalists, thus re-circulating her as a commodity 
across activist markets. She moved from a commodity in the flesh market to a commodity 
first in the investigative journalism market, soon to be further re-commodified in activist 
human rights and social action markets.  Years later she emerges as an item in intellectual 
property rights markets when The Indian Express sued a renowned playwright for the 
violation of their copyright in the story that they first published! Her multifarious 
commodification ends for all purposes with her disappearance from New Delhi Nari 
Niketan (state remand home for women), without a trace of mourning or memorialization.    
Similar images haunt us were we to ask: How may we mourn and remember a Mathura, a 
Maya Tyagi, a Ramiza Bee, and a Phoolan Devi? How may we mourn countless other 
nameless women (therefore with unnameable suffering) whose violation we did not choose to 
inscribe on the tableau of women’s and human rights activism? How may we give the 
fragments of their existence the status of historic memory? How may the archives of their 
memory relate to the possibility of justice? (See, for a recent exploration, Kalpana and 
Vasanth Kannbiran, 2002.)  
The laudable endeavour of the CWDS to commemorate the Silver Jubilee of Towards 
Equality requires a visitation of these multitudinous absent presences, of those who were 
already there ‘without being not there.’  
V1 MEMORY, NORMATIVE EXPECTATIONS, AND JUSTICE  
 
The experience of injustice always involves normative expectations. Take these away and 
you lose the very possibility of experience of injustice. The other may not be said to violate 
the Self, which has no expectation of how the other ought to regard it, no bases for 
articulating this expectation, no memory for its narrative history. Domination and 
exploitation become naturalized.  The piety of Manu and his dharmasastric inheritors thus, 
overall, clearly naturalized patriarchy, making women incapable of experiencing and voicing 
injustice; it decreed the Hindu law as a kind of fate for them. Fate is something that 
overwhelmingly defeats the vocabularies of human justice. Submission is the only possible 
response where no normative expectations crowd consciousness. 
At least two questions here arise: first, the construction of the notion of ‘normative’ 
expectations and second, the problem of translation into languages of justice.  
As concerns the first, while we may with Bentham (1975) understand expectations as pre- 
sentiment’ that endows us with power to plan and to maintain a certain kind of continuity in 
our lives, this merely  (though importantly enough) describes existential expectations. We 
had to await Niklas Luhman to grasp the contrast between normative and contingent 
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expectations. The peculiar quality of normative expectations is that they survive, even grow 
stronger, in the face of disappointment; the more they stand violated, the greater is their 
moral strength. In contrast, contingent/ existential expectations do not survive repeated 
disappointments.  
The question of relatedness of normative expectations to justice is a formidable territory.   
An easy enough answer is always at hand: normative expectations that violate human rights 
are unjust. But the normative expectations that human rights create for arts and act of living) 
or the ‘lifeworld,’ to evoke Habermas) remain highly indeterminate. The relationship of 
justice to human rights is infinitely complicated. At a normative level, human rights norms 
and standards constitute hierarchies between civil and political rights (eligible for here and 
now implementation) and ‘manifesto’ rights (whose ‘progressive’ realization stands 
constantly differed.) in which some rights remain subject to ‘progressive realization.’ Indeed, 
the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Indian Constitution may be said to have 
birthed this human rights dichotomy.  Besides, human rights remain subject to long night of 
darkening interpretive performances. Human rights further remain prey to structural 
adjustment in general and structural adjustment in particular of judicial activism. While states 
and societies that overall respect human rights, in the main, may be called politically just, it 
remains doubtful in the extreme that these deliver justice in the ‘basic structure ‘ of society 
(as John Rawls names this.)  
Liberal human rights create freedom for oneself but scarcely responsibility for the other. 
This is a truth we know from Marx. But if you are uncomfortable with that memory, let me 
mention Emmanuel Levinas who identifies the ‘Rights of Man’ with freedom that is 
indifferent to the other in distinction with tasks of justice that requires ‘non-indifference’ to 
the other, a form of ‘inexhaustible responsibility’ for the face of the other (Levinas, 1993: 
115.)  
It is thus clear that normative expectations may respect at times respect human rights 
without necessarily respecting responsibility for justice.        
V11 CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCREATION OF HISTORIC AND FUTURE 
MEMORY 
The Indian constitution, I believe, installs social memory at the heart of its production of 
normative expectations. But whose memories, what memories, stand thus consecrated in 
constitution and the law poses a crucial question.  
Of its several constitutive ambiguities, the foremost is embodied in the very first article 
opening with the words: ‘India that is Bharat…’ The reference to India that is Bharat achieves 
two things: first, an archive a continuity of memory and expectation with the colonial 
project and second, articulation of the constitutional imagination of a postcolonial India..  
What may be saying about the other identity—Bharat? What histories of memory, justice, 
and rightlessness may this be said to consecrate? Does it contain codes of memory and 
identity of some vision of pre-British, even millenarian, Hindu empire and civilization? What 
would the word ‘Bharat’ mean, for example, to a Konyak Naga, a Bhil, a Santhal, and a Bodo 
person/ woman? What would this mean to India’s Islamic peoples, among them the Bohras, 
Meos, Khojas, the Ahmadiyas, the Shias and the Sunnis? And what may this notion convey 
to Indian Christians, the Parsees and the microscopic Jewish communities? And how may 
relate the idea of Bharat to the diasporic Tibetan, Pakistani, and East Bengal (Bangla Deshi) 
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migrants to India after the independence?   How may be one an Indian without at the same 
time being a Bharati? What mix of human rights and rightlessness does this all signify?  
The standard answer to all these questions invites us to the ‘idea’ of India as one vast 
paracommunity of diversity, represented by its ‘multinational,’ ‘multi-religious,’ 
‘multiethnic,’ ‘multicultural’ coalescence and confluence. Such meta- narratives idealizing 
‘India’ (her syncretism, pluralism, tolerance, and coexistence) forsakes the collective memory 
the manifold histories of violence and human violation contained in the dominant modes of 
production of human rightlessness in contemporary India.  
The idea of constitutional India that is Bharat is at once (to invoke the phrase regime of 
Robert Cover, 1987) both jurisgenerative and jurispathic. It thus simultaneously names 
patterns of destruction and creation, of national identity and identification and sub, even 
anti, national resistance and struggle. It generates both politics of and for human rights (see 
Baxi, 2002 for this distinction) within diffuse and contradictory, yet hegemonic, cultures of 
dominance. Even as constitutional governance, with all its autosclerosis, perpetuates 
obscenely unjust forms of domination, it also provides space for the birthing of New Social 
Movements. Not all such movements are emancipative, indeed some may be irremeably 
jurispathic as the histories of Hindutva that escalate the potential of Bharat against that of 
‘India,’ now fully alert us.      
Any pursuit of women’s rights as human rights needs to address the genealogies that shape 
the dire terms of politics of memory. Deepak Mehta and Roma Chatterjee in their study of 
Dharavi (2001: 227) speak to us ‘ how…genealogy remains present in the memory through 
fear and danger…’ and how practitioners of memory are ‘constituted by a faculty of 
forgetting as well as remembering.’ But this much is clear: both ‘India’ and ‘Bharat’ create 
and sustain communities of danger and fear, and the dialectic of the ‘displaced’ and ‘retrieved’ 
self (Id. at 233-239.)    
The constitutional order, and the legal system that it sanctifies, plays a large role in this 
unfoldment. Notable advances in the rule of law, and the protection and promotion of 
human rights, have also been accomplished by a fantastic growth of the culture of impunity 
through which alone competitive liberal politics makes any sense to its practitioners and 
proponents. The violated of the 1984 Sikh genocide, of the post Babri Masjid demolition 
carnage, and now of Gujarat 2002, mark the transition of a postcolonial state and society to a 
neo-colonial one that signifies (in Kwame Nkrumah’s immortal phrase regime) ‘power 
without responsibility and exploitation without redress.’   
Militant Hindutva politics increasingly seeks to swiftly resolve India into Bharat. The VHP, 
Bajrang Dal and associated outfits cultivate the paranoia of the majority Hindu communities, 
especially through their violent critique of constitutional secularism. All this contributes to a 
paradigm shift for India’s constitutional governance; politics of identity takes over from 
politics of redistribution.  
 
Only a decade ago the ‘progressive’ official and activist prose centred upon a very different 
order of normative expectations: struggle against impoverishment and agrestic serfdom, 
agrarian reform, and participative democracy.  Now the focus shifts from the constellation of 
contrasts between India and Other India to India versus Bharat, complicating further the 
discourse concerning Indian globalization by the focus on revivalist forms of economic 
nationalism. All this has tremendous implication on Indian women’s plight and rights. The 
quest for what Sahid Amin has recently named as the 'New Indian National’ the ‘persons -in-
Upendra Baxi, Memory and Rightlessness, J.P.Naik Memorial Lecture, CWDS 
December 13, 2002; final text May 25, 2003 
 
13 
communities who are struggling against the homogenising currents’ remains equally 
important for renascent women’s studies.  
 
How may renascent women’s studies confront the revival of partition –like violence? I 
believe that new narratives of genocidal violence (the       résistance of social theory, now 
inaugurally visiting the horror of the Indian partition in the corpus of Ritu Menon, Kamla 
Bhasin, Urvashi Butalia, Veena Das, and Gyan Pande, for example) provide a worthwhile 
antidote to constitution and human rights fetishism. The underestimation of ‘the making of 
the event and the heritage called Partition,’ (Pande, 2001: 66), and the violence of the law, 
that sphere that authorizes both the rule of law and practices of Holocaustian violence 
(Agamben, 1998) thrives on the assassination of memories of injustice.  In a foundational 
sense the postcolonial law as the 'state's emissary’ (to evoke Ranajit Guha's famous phrase) is 
profoundly imbricated in the production and seduction of memory. Neither the ‘Old’ nor 
the ‘New’ Indian Nation remains capable of comprehension, let alone amelioration and 
redress, unless we learn ways to combat the conflation of the rule of law with the reign of 
terror.       
            
V111 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF KYA HAI, KUCH NAHI  
  
This question invites recourse to Mahasweta Devi’s jurisprudence, the implicit critique of 
state and the law; of activism and as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak put it, “the ‘New Women’ 
of the South ‘structural interpreters,’ hybridists, or popular culturists when necessary, 
environmentalists when possible, quite like Shital Mallya [the remarkable character in 
‘Behind the Bodice: Choli Ke Pichhe’] or Gayatri Spivak (1998: xiii.)  
 
Mahasweta Devi in Choli Ke Pichhe (1996) answers the refrain kya hai thus:  
‘There is no non-issue behind the bodice, there is a rape of people behind it.’ This rape of 
people, the ganadharshan, is something that (with the antihero Upin) we would know, if we 
wanted to (p.157.)  
 
The decisive question then is; should we want to know something that we do not want to know?  
Should we chose to read, in each and every episode of rape and allied forms of sexual 
exploitation, also the texts of the rape of peoples, of justice, human rights, rule of law, and 
substantive visions of a deliberative democracy? 
 
How may we read individual biographies as social texts/ narratives, mindful of individual 
pain and suffering at the destruction of the integrity of intimacy and of individual life 
projects yet constructing a socius, the collective habitat of violent memory that speaks to us 
of forms of ganadharshan?         
 
Women’s studies (an imperfect appellation to describe vibrant bodies of new knowledges of 
the carnal powers in state and society) have at last begun to explore histories of Partition 
violence precisely in these terms, through the labours of Urvashi Butalia, Ritu Menon, 
Kamla Bhasin and Veena Das. This resuscitation of histories of violent memory remains 
indeed precious, even when pursued after half-century-old social theory oblivion. The 
question thus arising, however, is how may we extend this discursivity to contemporary 
critical events?   
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It is on this register that Mahasweta Devi’s Choli ke Pichhe must be allowed fully to address 
our activist praxis and imagination. 
 
Her story begins with the ways in which the ‘issues will and do trample upon non-issues in 
the life of the nation, this is the rule’ (p.  139.) ‘What is there’, kya hai, became the national 
issue that made other issues into non-issues, kuch nahi.  
 
[T]he other fuckups of that time--.e.g. crop failure- earthquake, everywhere 
clashes between socalled terrorists and statepower and therefore killings, the 
beheading of a young man and woman in Haryana for the crime of marrying 
out of caste, the unreasonable demands of Medha Patkar and others around 
the Narmada dam, hundreds of rape-murder-lockup torture et cetera which 
by natural law approached but failed to reach highlighting in the newspapers 
-all these remained non-issues. Much more important than this was choli ke 
pichhe, behind the bodice (p.138.)        
 
The discursive logic of the interlocution kya hai produces on the register of non-issues the 
response kuch nahi, it is nothing or as the Roman law maxim says de minimis non curat lex, 
the law does not take account of trifles. The various forms of ganadharshan, mentioned in the 
above passage, are non-issues on the logic of de minimis. The suffering and death thus 
imposed are mere trifles, of interest merely as instances of ‘investigative journalism,’ resource 
raising for projects, doctoral dissertations, and seminars, events where as Mahasweta Devi 
describes these: ‘ Indian intellectuals not knowing a single Indian language meet in a closed 
seminar in the capital city and make the wise decision known’: truth to say the postmodern 
equivalents of the Chandi Chowk popular deliberations stand epitomized by the India 
International Centre (now also the Habitat Centre and their virtual counterpart the Star TV) 
in ways that constantly marks the conversion of the issue into non-issues.  
 
 Mahasweta Devi’s reference to the ‘natural law’ that converts issues into non-issues thus 
represents a fantastic inversion. In the at least two millennia old (measured by the Northern 
timescale) discourse concerning natural law, iusnaturalism, natural law signified a higher law 
that Antigone-like, or if your prefer Marx -like, challenges the very authority of demonic/ 
hegemonic law formations. In Choli ke Pichhe, natural law merely authorizes ascension of 
injustice and human violation to the fungible status of newspaper headlines or columns and 
celebrity discussions on multiple television channels. Indeed, this new natural law of mass 
communication serves as a naturalising marker of violence against women and the rape of the 
demos. It demotes the real issues into non-issues.  Or at best translates them into perishable 
commodity forms of voguish activist conversation.  
 
But this inversion also marks a revival of natural law, understood very differently as 
authorising recurrence of Radical Evil on ever-massive scales. By definition, states of Radical 
Evil render memory and rightlessness trivial and insignificant, except as commodification 
that takes many forms of ‘fuckups ’in the political timeplace that Mahasweta Devi mentions 
in the quoted passage.  
 
Allow me a moment of elaboration with respect to each of the forms.  
 
What can we do, to start with, in feminist theory and praxis, with the first fuckup-- ‘crop 
failure?’ There is hardly any upsurge of feminist theory and praxes starvation, draught, and 
famine, comparable with (no doubt extremely pertinent) issues of sexual harassment at 
workplace, Uniform Civil Code, Sati, the belated but extremely significant studies 
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concerning violation of women in the Partition Holocaust, and the future of the women-in 
the- nation.  
 
Crop- failure, drought, and famine (all shorthand for enormous human suffering costs) 
remains a non-issue so long as because we do not choose to see it as a planned Holocaust of 
Indian citizens, especially in a situation where storage of vast grain surpluses remains legible 
only as a text of political /administrative management. We feel powerless to do much about 
it except as passive consumer of mass media reports on starvation in Indian states, and as 
producers of sophisticated discourses on development as freedom mainly because our 
political unconscious reiterates the drawing of a distinction between misfortune and injustice.     
 
That distinction is of course conveniently supple. Quite rightly, we regard state failure in 
achieving a Uniform Civil Code or coping with violence against women as injustice. But 
agrarian tragedies are by and large read as events of misfortunes, rather than act of injustice. 
Judith Shklar (1990) begged us to revisit this distinction; Indian women’s studies have as yet 
to respond, despite the precious prodding by Amrita Rangaswami concerning the need to 
regard famine related deprivation as a human rights injury and violation and the recent 
stirring by P. Sainath’s Everyone Loves a Good Drought.  
 
The other form of ‘fuckup’ that Mahasweta Devi mentions has been an object of some 
concern. The ‘clashes between the so-called terrorists and statepower,’ however, has (as far as 
I know) produced no sustained feminist meditation other than Gayatri Spivak’s concerning 
Mahasweta Devi’s Draupadi. The so-called gender justice dimension, in the mainstream 
women’s studies, does not foreground this memory or that of Mary Oran in Mahasweta 
Devi’s Imaginary Maps (1993.) Would it be justified then to say that   liberal mainstream 
women’s studies remain somewhat complicit with state terrorism in missing almost 
altogether the sound bytes of revolutionary feminist praxes? We ought at least to ask: how 
narrowing are / remain our conceptions of women’s solidarity intermeshed with the Male in 
the State (to invoke the fecund expression from Wendy Brown, 1985) in ways that render 
revolutionary praxes of Indian women to the status of a non- issue?  Incidentally, as Ayesha 
Jalal recently reminds us, some redress for this lack may become available were we to 
construct memories not just of victims but also of the perpetrators of Partition- like violence.   
 
 
The third form of ‘fuckup’ that Devi mentions is the very stuff, the warp and the woof, of 
Indian feminist and human rights theory and practice, one that vociferously protests civil 
society violence and state/ law effeteness in combating this (‘the ‘punishment’ under the 
signature of caste hegemony in Haryana and the ‘hundreds of rape-murder- lockup torture,’) 
Obviously, and legitimated by the new Indian ‘natural law,’ violence against women in state 
and society is a major issue for women’s and human rights activism. But we all excel in 
episodic heroism, not in a struggle for structural transformation.  
 
Allow me to take three examples.  
    
First, even as liberal feminist movement invests much of its energy in law reform and judicial 
action in the arena of dowry violence and murder, it fails to transform into practice at an 
individual level the logic of abhorrence for socially evil practices. Progressive women who 
remain juridically militant against dowry marriages do in fact, and for the most part hold and 
attend ostentatious wedding receptions and related events. There are as far as I know few 
takers of the militant path that Seema Sakahre in Nagpur and in part Subhadra Butalia (2002) 
and Madhu Kishwar have followed in Delhi; the movement led by Sakahre actually seeks to 
disrupt ostentatious wedding ceremonies / receptions, on a rather regular basis. In the 
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absence of meaningful social boycott that will invest (what Bentham named as) popular 
sanctions to the legal ones, the latter will remain more or less ineffective.   
 
Second, there seems to prevail a culture of causus celebre, under which some actual episodes of 
violence providing the defining marks of national and regional women’s movements. From 
the Mathura Case to Gujarat 2002, we have archived narratives of resilient movement and 
action directed against violation of women. Considerable changes in law, policy, and 
administration have resulted. Yet the more things change, the more they remain the same, 
indeed even worse they become. We surely need to ask:  why it is the case that the greater 
activism there is the more is the escalation of women’s violation?  
 
The more, in Mahasweta Devi’s distinction, important the issue becomes the more it also 
emerges in the form of a series of non-issues. The Gujarati Bahens who prepared the Desi 
Molotov cocktails (kakaras) during the recent Gujarat 2002, and on the whole turned a blind 
eye to the violation of their sisters, just as women and men who surrendered themselves to 
the ‘clarion’ call of ‘Sadhvi’ Ritambara’s taped messages invoking/ justifying the ek dhaka aur 
do [give one more push] Babri Masjid demolition mission and message and the Indian-wide 
carnage of ‘ethnic cleansing’ that ensued, exemplify narratives that reproach our collective 
success. The 'more' paradoxically becomes the 'less,' reminiscent of the dialectical Hegelian 
moment of conversion of quantity into quality.   
 
    Third, take the issue of sexual harassment at workplace and its systemic conversion into a 
series of non-issues. I will not insert my biographical experience here save to say that when I, 
rather inaugurally, articulated discourse on this issue, the Delhi University campus exploded 
with fierce moral indignation in ways that ‘shot’ the messenger! Outside that moment of 
high moral frenzy, it is since then business as usual in Delhi and other campuses; indeed 
prominent women and human rights NGOs that welcomed the normative bonanza of the 
Supreme Court in Visakha have as yet (to the best of my knowledge) not developed in their 
domain an effective policy that they seek to militantly implement elsewhere. The other-
regarding moral altruism of women’s movements tends ultimately to impoverish its own 
moral plenitude.     
 
These, and related examples, remain narratives of kya hai, kuch nahi jurisprudence of non- 
issues. We need to understand how this happens and what may collectively do to avoid this 
transformation of the vital interlocution kya hai into nothingness responsiveness of kuch 
nahi.   
1X Pyaar and Bhakti  
 
I now wish briefly to turn to the domains of love and worship that fully illustrate strikingly 
different source of normative expectations where living up to normative expectations 
presents a radically different discourse. 
 
Pyaar (romantic love) and Bhakti (devotion) ground normative expectations (and ordering of 
memory) differently than the logics, paralogics, and languages of contemporary human rights 
(Baxi, 2002.) In romantic love or worship ‘happiness’/ ‘joy’ is born out of different degrees of 
surrender which memory prizes the loss of reflexivity. The Beloved or God in either sphere 
stands constituted by the experience and imagination of complete surrender.  
 
But there is an important difference. One likes to think that the choice of Beloved, in the 
sphere of romantic love, is not usually a function of domination by the market or the state; 
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that is why ‘free love’ has always been a banner of revolt against structures of power. We are 
not born to love; we chose our loves in authentic acts of agency. That choice is often the 
stuff of tragic history but it is the act of choosing that triggers the tragic events and episodes. 
In tragic deaths, lovers transcend the protocols of power that state and society effetely chose 
to impose.     
 
In Bhakti, often enough, our birth in a community determines our faith.  Our Gods are 
chosen for us or, rather, they chose us; regardless, we repudiate them at our own peril.  And 
indeed in situations of religious militancy, like the rise of Hindutva, for example, we adhere 
to them also at our own peril.     
 
Romantic love of and for other humans is this worldly; worship the love of God, is 
otherworldly. The logics, languages, and rhetoric of human rights remain rather 
inappropriate to these domains. Both have their aim, this pyaar and this Bhakti transcendence 
from the economy and the polity. Both also from the here and now standpoint of this-
worldly feminism mystify exploitation (including auto exploitation) of women in society.  
 
There are other ways of reading Pyaar and Bhakti.  Ranajit Guha in Dominance without 
Hegemony (1997) has shown how idioms of Bhakti carry over to practices of domination and 
politics of dasvya, the glorification of political servitude and total obedience and the role this 
plays in the construction of classical Hindu patriarchy where Bhakti  ‘ for the husband is the 
first stage’ of worshipping God, reconstituting Bhakti ‘ as an ideology of subordination par 
excellence’ (pp.47-55.) Martha Nussbaum (2000) somewhat similarly peregrinates through the 
geographies of ‘adaptive preferences’. Both however suggest importantly that the rather 
heroic attempt may still be tinged by rationalities that carry political messages.  
 
One may say even that forms of romantic love open themselves in terms of reading the texts 
of hyperglobalisation; forms that thrive on commodification of transantionally induced and 
shaped desires. In the present day cyber world of E-romance, internet sex, and hard porn 
female stars that celebrate women’s emancipation by having as many as 150 live sexual 
unions on screen within sex market erotic schedules of two hours, romantic love may hardly 
be said to be subversive of market and what remains of the idea of a nation state and 
cosmopolitan human rights as furnishing a ‘moral’ community.   
 
Pyaar construed merely in heterosexist terms entails surrender of a different kind, surrender 
to dominant moral majorities for the time being. The lesibgay/ transgender forms of 
intimate human association now mark a new frontier sexualising the languages and logics of 
contemporary human rights. Towards Equality remained, understandably innocent (and 
indeed in many respects complicit) of differential logics of human desires and the forms of 
their global commodification. 
 
The question all this foregoing presents concerns re-envisioning of the central tenets of 
Towards Equality.    
 
X GROUNDING OF THE AUTHORITY OF EXPECTATIONS IN CARING, NOT 
JUSTICE   
 
All this being fully said, do forms of Bhakti remain more morally altruistic than romantic 
love because women’s surrender to God in its extraversion also tends to be subversive of 
extant social and political ordering? We need to ask whether this subversion founds new 
forms of authoritative expectations. 
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In feminist ethics, these issues stand posed differently in ways that celebrate values and 
cultures of care rather than of justice. 
 
Mother Theresa provides an interesting exemplarship. She, and her mission, seeks to provide 
dignity in dying and death, denied plentifully in the acts of survival and human rights 
enunciations of the right to life. Here is a supreme example of assertion of duties of caring, 
rather than claiming of rights. It would desecrate her memory to ask why she never filed a 
social action petition before the Supreme Court of India! Truth to say, she chose an 
incredibly difficult and painful path, valorising care, love, and nurture over human rights 
norms, standards, and values.     
 
The distinction between justice and care, as Carol Gilligan reminded us quite some time ago, 
is crucial. She said, memorably: 
 
…women not only define themselves in the context of human relationships 
but also judge themselves in terms of their ability to care. Woman’s place in 
man’s life cycle has been that of a nurturer, caretaker, helpmate, the weaver 
of those networks of relationships on which she in turn relies (1979.) 
 
 
Indian readers of Mahasweta Devi’s Standayini will surely want to agree in a greater richness 
of understanding of semi-feudal marketization of caring practices and cultures. Jasodha, 
ultimately a co-Brahmin, is transformed into a care provider in semi- jajmani web of 
exploitative Bhadralok seamless culture. At the same time, she configures for us the image of 
a Brahmin dalit.   
 
Romantic love and transcendental Bhakti celebrate myriad forms of rightlessness as 
exemplars of good life.  In sum, the languages of the heart and habits of the surrender to the 
Ultimate (however conceived) have little or no use for languages of human rights and 
rightlessness. But not all forms of this ‘rightlessness’ are callous and cruel. At the same time, 
humane forms of caring as instances of otherworldly feminisms pose considerable challenges 
to our human rights essentialisms.    
 
X1 OTHERWORLDLY FEMINISMS 
 
 
This brings us face to face with otherworldly feminisms. How may these converse with this - 
worldly feminism? It was anthropologist Lawrence Babb who inaugurally, I believe, invented 
this discursive contrast through his study of the Brhamakumari Movement. It provides 
perhaps the largest network of otherworldly feminist movement linking ideas about 
women’s emancipation with attempts at feminising global peace movement. The founder of 
this movement was a battered wife who identified marriage as the root cause of women’s 
subjugation and oppression; she founded a movement on the simple idea of repudiation of 
marriage. The Brides of Brahma do not repudiate sexuality but sublimate it in emancipative 
ways via dedication to Prajapati, a supreme iconic figure who sustains the cosmos.  This 
dedication then marks a new form of women’s power over a male dominated world, albeit 
via distinctive ways of cosmic mediation.  
         
Secularised, this- worldly, human rights women’s movement, and feminist theorizing, does 
not quite come to engage conceptual and social histories (cf. Koselleck, 2000) of otherworldly 
feminisms. But some general questions may not be any more ignored: How are the necessary 
and general distinctions between this and other worldly feminism to be drawn? How may 
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we tell stories concerning the nature of relationship between the two, in terms of contending 
virtues of justice and care? Are there latent cosmologies, too, in forms of this -worldly Indian 
feminism?  How do these relate to rightlessness and its reproduction? Why have Indian 
women’s studies, on the whole, neglected explorations of otherworldly feminisms?    
 
These are large questions, themselves in need of continuing refinement. But even the naiveté 
of posing the field of interrogation thus should suffice for the present purpose. Activist 
Indian women are, as far as I know, not wholly averse to acts of public worship (signified by 
their participation in popular engagement of masses of women in the Durga Puja, the 
Navaratri, the worship of Vaishno Devi at Jammu) that pay obeisance to cosmological 
memories, pitted against finite life celebrations of women’s equality and emancipation. At 
play here are different lifeworlds and worldviews. And, indeed, infinitely variegated 
conceptions of good life, demoting to the realm of secularised fabrication the performances 
of memory of human rights. 
 
Further, the progressive, otherwise secular, women’s activism stands confronted in everyday 
life performances by the overload of normative expectations of the otherworldly Indian 
feminisms. This suggests sites of fascinating cohabitation between forms of Bhakti type 
surrender and activism for women’s rights human rights. To deepen the contrast, allow me 
to turn to the current dilemmas of this worldly Indian feminism. 
 
X11 GUJARAT 2002: BUSINESS STILL AS USUAL? 
 
Mahasweta Devi’s corpus reproaches us all, in our multifarious activisms, for our collective 
failure to name the celebration of rape culture as a way of doing politics (Baxi, 2002a.).  Rape 
cultures signify women’s bodies as violent scripts texts of politics, and dominant cultures, 
also the sites of production of human rightlessness. 
 
We have not quite been able to name the practices of Indian politics as rape culture. Thus, 
the hard-core pornography of Indian political power available to quotidian experience 
escapes Indian women’s studies and political theory. While superbly well endowed in dealing 
with the episodic instances of women’s violation, ever since the historic marker (the Open 
Letter to the Chief Justice of India concerning the Mathura Case, Baxi et. al. 1979), we lack the 
narrative power that renders the episodic manifestations of rape culture as also systemic ones: 
witness, for example, the myriad forms of our activist incoherence haunted with the 
chronically recurrent situations of sati, female infanticide (whether in crude forms or those 
mediated by advanced prenatal technologies), child marriage and prostitution, marital rape, 
spreads of the new AIDS generations whether through pre-martial/ co-martial/ extra-martial 
sexual congresses, male and transgender custodial rapes, sexual harassment in sexwork market 
by ‘clients’ and  various law enforcement folks.  
 
How may women’s studies address and cope with, both in terms of conceptual resources and 
material ones (that necessarily commoditized women’s violation via the mobile frontiers of 
global funding agencies), with tasks of systemic combat is the sovereign question. Is our 
shared lack of narrative power understandable in terms of Antonio Gramsci: does too much 
of our activist praxis remains contingent at levels of the ‘ war of manoeuvre’; and too little of 
it approaches the dimension of ‘war of position’?   
 
Our practices of this -worldly feminisms meet their Waterloo, their nemesis, in the figure of 
a multitude of Gujarati Bahens, whose newly instituted civic religion of Hindutva poignantly 
transfer normative expectations arising in contexts of love and worship, marking the 
transition from romantic and pious to political agency. Gujarat 2002 women participating in, 
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and justifying, violence against women mark feats of agency configure the ‘secular’ with the 
otherworldly forms of submission to God- like iconic figures. The fabrication of Gujarati 
Asmita (Baxi, 2002a) now provides a new fused theology that lays the foundations of 
Hindutva both as civic and spiritual religion. The figure of Narendra Modi invites near total 
religio- political surrender and plants deep roots of justification of moral, even constitutional, 
paternalism/ maternalism.  
 
That category of Gujarati Bahens remains violently exclusive but it is at the same time 
perniciously bonding. Women lead the way not just in the march of spontaneously 
‘organized’ communal violence, but also in the mode that sustains everyday hostile 
discrimination through social boycotts against ‘minority’ communities that continues in 
vicious forms of civic boycott even on the anniversary of the massacre.      
 
Was the Gujarat 2002 brutal production of human rightlessness, a function, of politically 
fabricated loyalties to memories produced by party machines and the Hindutva militant 
forces, also a reproduction of women -specific primordial memory? If so, what remains 
women-specific in the configuration of Asmita abruptly redefining the narrative identity of 
women praxes of mass violence, both as active agents and complicit bystanders?   
  
Their ‘joy’ of surrender constitutes a million miseries for their co-citizens.  The secular 
feminist/ women’s movements rightly (in my opinion) ask them to realize their moral 
mistake and to renounce false gods. How do we identify the false gods in need of 
renunciation? Indeed, one may ask, is activism for human rights merely a series of 
transactions amongst false gods?   
 
Easily enough, we may say that these are Gods already contained in the hastily and bloodily 
constructed Hindutva pantheon. How about the revolutionary icons that Mahasweta Devi’s 
Draupadi subjects to the work of mourning? How about the civic ‘religion’ of Naxalite 
women that celebrates violence for equality? How about the violence of women living the 
life of social banditry, like Phoolan Devi that savagely disorient and disarray the dominant 
Indian feminist theory and practice? There is need, I believe, to grasp the distinctive contexts 
where women emerge as violent political actors that enable some tolerable distinction 
between forms of violence as ‘reactionary’ and ‘revolutionary.’ What politics of memory and 
rightlessness do these iconic figures embody for contemporary Indian feminist theory and 
practice?  
 
The agonized mainstream women’s studies ensemble is as yet not quite able to address 
reactionary violence because it never fully poses, let alone address adequately, the issue of 
revolutionary women’s violence. But the difference between Gujarati Bahens and Draupadi 
matters and we need to find ways to articulate this differend, this infinitely varied discursive 
incommensurability.   
 
Today the World Bank and related languages signify a measurable quotient of women’s 
‘empowerment,’ a term that assures significant flow of resources for women’s development 
studies but remains otherwise barren in terms of tasks of future histories of women’s 
emancipation.   
 
We must surely make some sort of distinction between types and forms of empowerment, 
howsoever uncongenial to national/ global funding auspices and agencies. How may we 
proceed with this agonizing task? 
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I raise these sorts of questions, contrary to all appearances, in women’s studies friendly mode 
as a species of internal critique.  
 
XIII TOWARDS A PRE-CONCLUSION 
 
I know that the mere act of raising these interrogations repeat the risk of my renewed exile 
from the charmed circles of contemporary Indian women’s study type activisms. At least 
Veena Mazumdar and Lotika Sarkar, among those present, will recall my first exile, when as 
a Chair of the ICSSR Women’s Studies Committee I dared to critique the onset of women’s 
studies as a ‘discipline’ in a working paper entitled: ‘Towards Liberation from Women’s 
Studies…’ (Baxi, 1994.)  
 
I raised then, at least partially, the issue of how women’s studies may read violence against 
women; I contested ways of knowledge production concerning this violence that 
‘projectized’ the violation of women in terms of ‘progressive’ research/ institutional 
engagement without the least fiduciary engagement with the plight of the docile bodies of the 
violated women. I even ventured the thought that funding auspices for research/ institution 
building legislate duties of on –site activist engagement.    
 
I renew this provocation, now in different ways in the context of Gujarat 2002. This poses 
not just the question of violence against women (always a crucial question) but also one 
concerning women as violent political actors. I further aggravate this by a collective summons 
to re- think, re-imagine, the logics and paralogics that manifest the passion of practical reason, 
which contextually justify violent women political action as exemplary moral agency. I dare 
to say to us all that the category of redemptive violence, howsoever undecidable, may never be 
deployable in terms of Gujarati Bahens’ perfromativity in 2002.  
 
In terms that chase connexions relating memory to production of human rightlessness, there 
are important tasks lying ahead, which ought to render ethically intelligible \ readable acts of 
political violence by women who pursue itineraries of emancipation from those women 
whose leitmotif stands constituted (in Ranajit Guha’s withering phrase) as ‘dominance 
without hegemony.’    
 
The thematics pursued here render me wholly unworthy of your gracious invitation for a J. 
P. Naik memorial lecture. My presentation today scarcely belongs to genre of illustrious 
predecessors in this Lecture series. On a rather personal note, I remain abashed by the feeling 
that J.P. Naik himself would have been uncomfortable with this peroration. Since the deed 
has now been done, bourgeois apologetics require me to extend to you all my sincere 
aoplogies without in the least being ungrateful. I may only hope that the CWDS may not for 
long time to come rue the mistake made in inviting me to this prestigious Lecture series. 
 
My time, and your human right to patience, requires me to close this conversation with a 
hope that we all move towards articulation of visions of postpatriarchal society in India, in 
ways that liberal and legal feminisms do not seem as yet to allow.  
 
Thank you all for your generous patience! 
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